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Directors of Banks? 
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Abstract: 
Among other characteristics, money laundering notably occurs across national borders and primarily 
through banks, and mainly because banks, which are both legitimate and ‘ubiquitous’ financial services 
institutions, engage primarily in financial intermediation. We ask, are the levers of control over banks’ 
involvement in money laundering and other financial crimes, more effective when pulled from the outside 
by government agencies or is there a less arm’s-length role for banks’ board of directors, by way of 
appropriately nuanced corporate governance? To answer this question, we first attempt to understand 
money laundering, its antecedents, its support mechanisms, and then how it may be tamed; with emphasis 
on the potential productive role of banks’ boards. At a general and/or high level, we recommend that the 
intervention of banks’ boards must focus (i.e., insist) on: (i) the primacy of transparency and upholding of 
both real and perceived reputational capital of the bank, and (ii) ascertaining that their banks’ relations 
with corresponding banks distributed across several national borders or association with banks 
domiciled in notorious tax havens, are demonstrably above board. 
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1. Introduction 
Among other characteristics, money laundering notably occurs across national borders and 
primarily through banks, and mainly because banks, which are both legitimate and ‘ubiquitous’ financial 
services institutions, engage primarily in financial intermediation (Barry-Johnston 2005, Chaikin 2006, 
2011 & 2017, Tsingou 2010, Zucman 2015, and others). Therefore, as the natural logical choice of 
launderers of ‘soiled funds’, a key question implicit in this chapter is: could effective corporate 
governance in financial institutions, particularly banks, possibly mitigate or stop this corrupt use of 
formal financial services institutions and markets? 
The idea of money laundering dates back many years and is linked to banking and investment 
transactions, which are carried out in presumed “safe” environments. It mainly manifests in individuals 
and firms hiding their earnings and ill-gotten funds from authorities as to: avoid being found out; 
circumvent paying taxes and/or the capturing of their pertinent data. Over time, from 2000-BC in China to 
September 11, 2001 in the US, there has been back and forth between illicit funds flow under varying 
activities and counter efforts to discourage them largely because of the huge economic sequences of the 
underlying illegal activities. This seemingly iterative process has since culminated in today’s set of anti-
money laundering laws and initiatives, such as FIU, FICA, AUSRAC, FATF, Patriot Act, and so on 
(Morris-Cotterill, 2001; El Qorchi, 2002; Unger, 2013; Zucman, 2015; and others). 
Clearly, for these mitigating and/or preventive initiatives to be effective, the levers for 
implementation must be in the grasp of government to a reasonable extent. The formal legitimate 
platforms co-opted into these illegal, if not, nefarious activities are financial services institutions, chief of 
which are banks
1
. Therefore, an additional key question here is: are the levers of control over banks’ 
involvement in money laundering and other financial crimes more effective when pulled from outside by 
government or is there a less arm’s-length role for banks’ board of directors (by way of appropriately 
nuanced corporate governance articulation)? 
To see our way through to how banks’ board of directors can assist, we need a good 
understanding of what the “animal” (money laundering) is like, how the animal comes to be, and what 
efforts governments have made thus far to tame the animal, as it were. The next sections, therefore, 
address these necessary background issues. Then follows thoughts on how board of directors of banks can 
contribute productively in better taming and curbing the money laundering menace. 
                                                          
1 Money laundering may not be nefarious but the activities or actions it sponsors, such as terrorism, human trafficking, arms 
dealing, etc., are clearly and increasingly becoming nefarious. 
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2. Money Laundering  
2.1. Origins and underlying theories of money laundering. 
Money laundering is the act of modifying proceeds from corrupt activities and crime (dirty 
money) into supposedly clean money (genuine resources). Money earned illegally from crimes and illegal 
or corrupt activities such as insider trading, extortion, illegal gambling, drug dealing and human 
trafficking, tax evasion, fraud, bribery, misappropriation of public funds, even armed robbery, is "dirty" 
and needs to be "cleaned" to seem legal and legitimate (Van Fossen 2003). The notion of money 
laundering has even expanded to include a variety of businesses and financial crimes, ranging from 
misuse of financial institutions/markets to financing of terrorism.  
Arguments persist on the origin of the term “money laundering”. Some believe money laundering 
originated from ownership of laundromats in the US in the 1920s, when some mafias attempted to 
legalize proceeds from illegal activities by using those proceeds to acquire legitimate businesses 
(Schneider 2008, Aluko and Bagheri 2012, McCarthy 2010). Some believe the term was first used in the 
1970s, during the Watergate scandal, when some illegal activities – ‘dirty tricks’ (connected to 
cash/‘black fund’ used by a presidential re-election committee) contributed to the resignation of President 
Richard Nixon
2
. As the verb “launder” means to wash or clean, the term “money laundering” simply 
adopts the figurative meaning of wash/clean to explain the act of legalizing dirty money (as pictorially 
illustrated in Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Figurative meaning of money laundering 
                    
Different definitions of money laundering have emerged from different countries, jurisdictions, 
organizations and authors. Thus, no consensus original definition of money laundering exists. What 
seems clear is that most definitions in the extant literature are based on a seemingly universal definition 
put forth by the UN convention on Drugs and an EU-directive, which relates money laundering to the 
legalization of illegitimate/forbidden/unlawful proceeds from criminal activities. This definition has been 
                                                          
2 http://www.word-detective.com/2012/02/money-laundering/. 
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adopted or modified and incorporated into national laws of member countries (Schneider & 
Windischbauer 2008, Schneider 2008). For example, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an 
intergovernmental body, defines money laundering as alteration of criminal earnings to disguise their 
illegitimate origin (Aluko & Bagheri 2012, Chaikin 2017).. 
FATF went on to develop a theory of the process of money laundering (Gilmore 2004). Though 
money laundering can sometimes take a highly complex form, the FATF theory conceptualizes money 
laundering as involving a three-stage process: placement, layering, and integration of funds. And these 
three predominant stages of the money laundering, can sometimes entail layers of arcane activities within 
one or two of these identifiable stages (Reuter and Edwin 2004).  
2.1.1. Placement  
Placement is the first identifiable stage of the laundering chain of activities, where the launderer 
moves the funds earned from illegal activities to a safe place that is less suspicious to law enforcement 
agencies. In most cases, the funds are deposited in bank accounts or lodged in other financial institutions 
or retail economy; consequently, such funds become mingled into the financial system. According to the 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC, 2014)
3
, methods of placement range 
from opening false bank accounts to placing cash deposits in multiple banks. The logic of using banks as 
a placement depot is that if illicit cash is deposited in a bank, the likelihood of tracing the criminal source 
of the cash is greatly minimized; thus, banks are the most attractive repository for placement of soiled 
money (Chaikin 2017).  
According to the Economist of 2014
4
, in over 200 countries, trillions of dollars are transacted 
each year by no less than 11000 financial institutions via the Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT) apparatus. Thus, there is a high probability that banks misuse SWIFT 
facilities for placement, by shifting illegally generated funds to offshore jurisdictions (SWIFT, 2016)
5
.  
2.1.2. Layering  
The second stage involves movement of the illicit fund through a series of deliberately intricate 
transactions, designed to make it more difficult to trace its original source. Indirectly, banks facilitate 
layering of illicit funds by allowing customers to operate multiple accounts with multiple banks, and 
across countries (AUSTRAC, 2014). Further, advancement in financial production technologies and 
existence of offshore financial hubs and corporation form of business has facilitated funds movement 
                                                          
3 http://www.austrac.gov.au/typologies-and-case-studies-report-2014. Retrieved December, 2017.  
4 https://www.economist.com/news/international/21633830-blocking-rogue-states-access-worlds-financial-messaging-network-
potent-measure. Retrieved December, 2017. 
5 https://www.swift.com/about-us/swift-fin-traffic-figures. Retrieved December, 2017. 
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across countries. Another means of clouding the original source of illicit monies is through the use/misuse 
of financial derivatives (Schneider and Windischbauer 2008).  
2.1.3. Integration 
At the integration stage, the process of money laundering is viewed to have come to completion. 
The illegal fund would have been integrated into the formal economy, such that there is no more 
differentiation between funds earned through legal and illegal means. Hereafter, the launderer can move 
his funds within a country, around the globe, or invest them in any legitimate business with little fear of 
detection. If the illicit fund had been moved offshore during the placement/layering stage, the launderer 
can now decide whether to move the fund back to home jurisdiction or allow it to remain offshore. And if 
the former is decided, the fund is moved back in a way that seems it had been legally earned abroad.   
The banking sector also plays an important and quite involving role at this stage just as in the first 
two stages. The integrated fund could be invested in property (backed by bank loans) or equity market via 
brokerage or wealth management firms.  
2.2. Sources of ‘soiled money’ needing laundering 
Often the literature takes ‘as a given’ that laundered monies simply appear “soiled” from 
nowhere, as it were, needing to be cleaned, without reflecting on their origins and why they need to be 
laundered. This is quite a significant omission that has bearing on the efficacy of measures put in place to 
combat the symptom of the problem (money laundering) instead of the sources of the soiled money 
(corrupt activities) and the antecedents of corruption. Understanding these linkages would enable 
governments and civil society to evolve mitigating measures at early stages (sources) of the problem. 
This, in turn, would attenuate the quantity of soiled monies needing to be laundered, and thus, make AML 
measures undoubtedly more efficacious. 
All else equal, corrupt activities are more likely in countries characterized by ethnic and/or racial 
fractionalization (Alesina & Ferrara 2000, Triesman 2000, Burgess et al. 2011, Delavallade 2012, Franck 
& Rainer 2012, Esteban et al. 2012, Feske & Zurimendi, 2017 and others). E.g., collective vigilance 
against looting and abuse of shared-wealth are more probable in societies where groups have a feeling of 
“it’s them against us” than in societies where people have a generally healthy sense of belonging (Alesina 
& Ferrara 2000, 2004; Gyimah-Brempong 2002, Alesina et al. 2003). In the same vein, where there is a 
high distributional problem (income inequality) whether it be on the basis of social class, income, race, 
gender, or whatever, there is more likely a sense of “it’s our turn to take our share of the national cake” 
than where members of a society have an overall sense of belonging (social cohesion) (Alesina, 1992, 
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Mustapha 2006, Franck & Rainer 2012, Dev et al. 2016, Alesina et al., 2016, Mthanti & Ojah 2017, and 
others).  
Weak institutional infrastructures, especially legal and political ones, have been shown to wreck 
control of corruption (Greif 1993, Gyimah-Brempong 2002, Djankov et al 2003, Mauro 2004, 
Delavallade 2012, and others). The extent to which the populace of a country is educated affects both the 
degree of inequality based on significantly divergent incomes attributable to education gaps, and ability to 
hold leaders accountable and/or organize effective civil society bodies (e.g., Van Rijckeghem & Weder 
1997, ACR 2015, and Dev et al. 2016). 
2.3. Consequences of financial crime and money laundering 
Countries have lost huge amounts of revenue through money laundering and financial crimes. 
Financial crimes have continued to increase in form, scale, as well as in the overall damage they cause 
both the global economy and individual national economies. According to the then Australian Crime 
Commission (ACC)
6
, as at December 2015, cost of financial crimes in Australia was estimated to be 
about US$27.40 billion (A$36 billion Australian dollars) per year, which equates to UD$1,188.02 
(A$1,561 Australian dollars) out of every individual Australian’s pocket, and thus, adds 6.3% to each 
individual’s average cost of living. Similarly, as at 2013 and 2014, ACC estimated that cost of organized 
crime in Australia stood at US$4.8 (A$6.3 Australian dollars) per capita. These figures are based on 
estimates, because the interconnectedness of legal and illegal financial activities thwarts efforts to 
correctly assess the exact magnitude of financial crime in Australia. Having highlighted Australia as an 
example, some of the notable cases of money laundering activities and estimated amounts involved across 
the world are summarized in Table 1. 
  
                                                          
6 https://www.acic.gov.au/sites/g/files/net1491/f/2017/08/oca_2017_230817_1830.pdf. Retrieved 16th December 2017. 
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Table 1: Notable cases of money laundering activities and estimated amounts involved 
Year Country Bank Reason Amount 
involved 
Amount fined Authority 
imposing fine 
2016 Singapor
e 
BSI
7
 Serious breaches of AML rules, & poor 
management oversight of the bank. 
 Outright bank 
closure 
Monetary 
Authority of 
Singapore 
2014 U.S BNP
8
 Paribas Falsifying records and violation of U.S. 
sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Sudan 
 US$8.9 billion United States 
Sanctions 
2014 UK Standard Bank, 
UK subsidiary
9
 
Failures in its AML controls.   US$12.6 
million 
UK Financial 
Conduct 
Authority  
2013 U.S Liberty 
Reserve
10
 
Money laundering US$6 
billion 
Outright bank 
closure 
United States 
Federal 
Authorities 
2012 U.S HSBC
11
 Money laundering which occurred 
throughout 2000s. 
 US$1.9 
Billion 
United States 
sanctions 
2012 U.S Standard 
Chartered
12
 
Money laundering in the 2000s over a 
decade of 60,000 transactions worth 
hundreds of billions US$ for Iran.  
US$250 
billion 
US$330 
million 
United States 
government 
agencies 
2006 Kenya Charter House 
Bank
13
 
Money laundering via multiple 
accounts of missing customer 
information.  
More than 
US$1.5 
billion 
placed under 
statutory 
management 
Central Bank of 
Kenya 
2005 US Bank of New 
York
14
 
Money laundering via accounts 
controlled by bank executives in 1990s. 
US$7 
billion 
US$38 
Million 
US government 
2000 Nigeria Sani Abacha
15,16
 Money laundering by former Nigerian 
military president, Sani Abacha and 
family in 1990s 
Between 
US$2-5 
billion  
Money to be 
returned to 
Nigeria  
Nigerian and 
Swiss 
governments 
1998 Nauru offshore shell 
banks
17
 
Russian criminal  laundered money 
through Nauru banks 
US$70 
billion 
 Russian central 
bank 
1996 US Franklin Jurado-
Rodriguez
18
 
Jurado-Rodriguez laundering for Cali 
Cartel in 1990s (Kochan 2011) 
About 
US$65 
Million 
About 2 years 
imprisonment 
US government 
1996 US Michael 
Abbell
19
 
Abbell charged for using legal skills to 
promote cocaine trafficking enterprise 
cocaine 
worth 
 US government 
                                                          
7 https://aml-cft.net/singapore-bsi-bank-ordered-to-shut-down/ AML-CFT. 25 September 2016. Retrieved 12 December 2017. 
8https://web.archive.org/web/20140715004002/http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/july/bank-guilty-of-violating-u.s.-
economic-sanctions/ . Retrieved 12 December 2017.  
9 https://mg.co.za/article/2014-01-23-standard-bank-fined-126-million-for-failures-in-anti-laundering-controls  
10http://abcnews.go.com/US/black-market-bank-accused-laundering-6b-criminal-proceeds/story?id=19275887.Retrieved 12  
December, 2017.  
11 https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/hsbc-to-pay-record-fine-to-settle-money-laundering-charges/. 
12 https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/standard-chartered-to-pay-u-s-330-million-to-settle-iran-laundering-claims/. 
13 https://correctiv.org/en/investigations/mafia-africa/articles/2015/04/16/charter-house-bank-money-laundering-machine/.  
14 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/09/business/bank-settles-us-inquiry-into-money-laundering.html.  
15 http://saharareporters.com/2014/03/06/how-abacha-and-associates-stole-billions-dollars-nigeria-%E2%80%94-report.  
16 http://www.newsweek.com/nigeria-switzerland-sani-abacha-corruption-434971.  
17 http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/10/magazine/the-billion-dollar-shack.html.  
18 http://www.nydailynews.com/amp/archives/news/admits-laundering-drug-cash-article-1.716159.  
19https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/06/18/from-respected-attorney-to-suspected-racketeer-a-lawyers-
journey/d60f376a-b7eb-4f48-8acb-8e5daf99fa4f/?utm_term=.7af01f113352.  
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in Cali, Colombia US$2 
billion 
1991 US and 
UK 
Bank of Credit 
& Commerce 
International 
(BCCI)
20
 
Financial crimes, money laundering, 
drug trafficking, bribery, concealment 
of treasury losses etc., in 1980s  
Unknown, 
estimated 
in billions 
of USD 
 UK and US 
investigators 
1991 Philippin
es and 
US 
Ferdinand 
Marcos 
Real-estate deals of former Philippines 
head, Ferdinand & Imelda Marcos 
Government assets laundered via banks 
in US, Liechtenstein, Panama, Cayman 
Islands, Vanuatu, Hong Kong, Vatican, 
Singapore, Bahamas, Switzerland, etc. 
Unknown, 
estimated 
in US$10 
billion  
 Philippines and 
US 
1987 Italy Institute for 
Works Religion 
(IOR)
21
 
Suspected money laundering by the 
IOR to several Italian banks in 1980s 
US$218 
million 
 Italian 
authorities 
 
3. Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Measures 
Prior to 1980, money laundering laws were meant to fight drug abuse and drug smuggling, 
mainly in the US. In fact, criminalization of drug abuse/smuggling in the 1920s was followed by several 
decades of US government’s fruitless efforts to minimize drug smuggling. In the attempt to win the said 
“war on drugs”, the regime of former US president, Bill Clinton, came up with the idea to confiscate 
earnings from drug deals, based on a refrain: “If one could not get to drug dealers.., then at least they 
should be discouraged, with the realization that they could not reap the monetary benefit of the illicit 
acts” (Unger 2013, p. 53). Based on this new anti-drug strategy, the US established the first anti-money 
laundering law in 1986, i.e., Money Laundering Control Act (1986), which then deemed money 
laundering a federal crime.  
Due to high level interconnectedness of money laundering activities and the ease of moving 
illegal earnings between countries, a specialist organization was established in the 1980s to set up global 
regulatory standards for AML laws. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established in 1989 by 
seven member countries, which has now grown to 35 member countries as at 2017
22
. The main objective 
of FATF is to issue recommendations with the aim of evolving legislations and policies for AML. For 
further insights on this, some selected national AML measures are summarized in Table 2. 
  
                                                          
20 https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/04crime.htm.  
21 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institute_for_the_Works_of_Religion and "Vatican Bank reported to be facing money-laundering 
investigation".  
22 Visit http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/#FATF for updates on country membership. 
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Table2: Selected examples of national AML measures  
Country AML regime Purpose of regime Date 
initiated 
Laws and Acts  
Afghanistan Financial Transactions 
& Reports Analysis 
Center of Afghanistan 
(FinTRACA) 2014 
To protect integrity of 
financial system, by 
combating money 
laundering.  
2014 FinTRACA was first established FIU under the 
AML and Proceeds of Crime Law in 2004.  
Australia Australian Transaction 
Reports & Analysis 
Centre (AUSTRAC)  
Assesses information 
from cash deals to 
mitigate money 
laundering.  
2006 Proceeds of Crime Act 1987. AML & Counter-
Terrorism Financing Act 2006 
Bangladesh Central Bank of 
Bangladesh & 
Bangladesh FIU 
Ensure country 
compliance with Int’l 
AML laws 
 FIU is governed by Money Laundering Prevention 
Act, amended and modified in 2002, 2008, 2009, 
2012 
Canada Financial Transactions 
& Reports Analysis 
Centre of Canada 
(FINTRAC). 
Ensure compliance 
with reporting stds, law 
& regulations. Prevent 
terrorism finance & 
threat to financial 
security.  
1991 Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act 
(PCMLA). Amended in 2000, and called Proceeds 
of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist 
Financing Act (PCMLTFA). 1st enacted in 1991, 
amended in 2000, 2002 & 2006  
India 
Enforcement 
Directorate. Ministry of 
Finance. Department of 
Revenue. 
Prevent money 
laundering. Confiscate 
properties involved in 
money-laundering 
2002 Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) 
2002, amended in 2013. 
Indonesia 
Indonesia’s FIU, 
known as the PPATK  
To combat money 
laundering  
2002 Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Center (INTRAC). Incorporated fight 
against terrorism finance in 2007.   
Slovak 
Republic 
(Slovakia)  
Slovak FIU of the 
National Police Agency 
To prevent money 
laundering 
  
South Africa 
Financial Intelligence 
Centre (FIC) and South 
Africa’s FIU    
Fight financial crimes, 
including money 
laundering, tax evasion 
& terrorism financing. 
2001 Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA). 1
st
 
amended in2013. In 2017 FICA amended to 
incorporate risk-based approach.  
United 
Kingdom 
The Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) 
 
 
FCA for all financial 
crime responsibilities 
formerly held by the 
British Financial 
Services Authority  
 
1. Terrorism Act (2000) contains UK AML laws  
2. Anti-terrorism, crime and security Act (2001). 
3. Proceeds of Crime Act (2002). 
4. Money laundering regulations (2007). 
5. Money laundering regulations, terrorist finance 
& transfer of funds regulations (2017) 
10 
 
United 
States 
Financial Crimes 
Enforcement network 
(FinCEN), which is 
US’s FIU   
  1. Bank Secrecy Act  (1970)  
2. Money Laundering Control Act, 1986 
3. Money Laundering & financial crimes strategy 
Act , 1998 
4. Annunzio-Wylie AML Act, 1992 
5. Intelligent Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act, 
2004 
 
4. Money Laundering, Tax Haven and Transparency 
The major question to be answered amidst in the money laundering saga is: what attracts a 
country to the proceeds from illegal activities? According to a report for the European parliament 
(PANA), in March 2017
23
, launderers were attracted to countries characterized by: developed financial 
institutions and markets, low record of corruption, and most importantly high secrecy and relatively fewer 
AML rules. Per this report, big European countries have high probability of being attractive to money 
launderers, with the UK on top of the list and exposed to billions of Euros of laundering annually; 
followed by France, Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands and Austria. 
However, according to Van Fossen (2003), since the 1970s offshore financial centers in the 
Pacific Islands have been battling with the threat of being cut off from the global financial system, due to 
accusations that they, as offshore centers, promote money laundering and harmful tax practices. Activity 
of tax havens in this region was brought to limelight in the Nauru saga, when Nauru was involved in the 
Bank of New York scandal of money laundering, tax evasion and illegal capital movement involving 
Russia. It was then understood that tax havens around the world facilitate placement, layering and 
integration of hundreds of billions of dollars earned from illegal drug deals (Van Fossen 2003).   
According to Kudrle and Eden (2003), the term tax haven refers to countries with suspicious 
financial activities that  appear large relative to the size of their total economy; thus, tilting their national 
policies toward creating: (1) Productive haven, where comparatively low tax rates are used to attract 
investment from other countries. (2) Headquarters haven, where firms are enticed with low tax rates to 
incorporate or re-incorporate in that jurisdiction. (3) Sham haven, where firms keep funds out of reach of 
their countries of domicile. (4) Secrecy haven, where investors disguise ownership of assets by investing 
offshore.  
                                                          
23http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/595371/IPOL_STU(2017)595371_EN.pdf. 
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Importantly, in 2012
24
, the OECD identified four key factors that could be used to ascertain whether or 
not a country can be deemed a tax haven: 
1. No taxes or only nominal taxes apply, 
2. Lack of transparency,  
3. Presence of policies that thwart or impede exchange of information for tax purposes, and 
4. Absence of requirements for verifying tax related activities. 
 
5. Financial Institutions and Compliance with AML Laws 
Given that without necessarily following the three identifiable phases of money laundering 
(placement, layering and integration), soiled money still get laundered largely through financial 
institutions, the reality, therefore, is that financial institutions and markets are smack-dab in the middle of 
money laundering. From our summary of notable money laundering activities in Table 1, all those 
activities went through banks of different countries. Notably, some of those transactions went through 
multiple banks before reaching their final destinations. The core of banking – financial intermediation – 
makes banks susceptible to involvement in money laundering directly or indirectly and willingly or 
unwillingly. For example, the Australian Criminal Intelligent Commission (ACIC, 2017)
 25
 notes that 
major money laundering channels exist as legitimate banking services such as money transfers, 
remittances, etc. (Chaikin 1991, 2006 & 2011) 
5.1. Financial institution roles in money laundering and possible remedies 
Money laundering activities and other financial system abuses can potentially undermine the 
stability of financial institutions and markets or the global financial system as a whole. Money laundering 
can alter resource allocation and wealth distribution; and it can be costly for an economy to investigate, 
detect, and eradicate money laundering activities. Damages to an economy can also arise not just as a 
result of abuse of the financial system, but as a result of the negative perceptions of the country exposed 
to or engaged in money laundering (Bartlett 2002). Due to such detrimental effects, many laws and 
regulations have been evolved to combat money laundering activities, and they unsurprisingly target 
financial institutions, especially banks.  
According to Levi and Reuter (2006), the fight against money laundering can be envisaged to 
follow a twin-track or twin-pillar approach, with one pillar referred to as  the preventive track (policy) and 
the second pillar referred to as the repressive or enforcement track. The preventive pillar aims to prevent 
                                                          
24https://web.archive.org/web/20120512074208/http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3343,en_2649_37427_30575447_1_1_1_37
427,00.html.  
25 https://www.acic.gov.au/sites/g/files/net1491/f/2017/08/oca_2017_230817_1830.pdf. Retrieved 16 December, 2017. 
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money launderers from using financial institutions to carry out their illicit activities, with the core 
objective being to protect the integrity of the financial system as a whole. This approach sets out 
identification and reporting responsibilities for bank. The repressive approach sets out laws to discipline 
money launderers (Van den Broek and Addink 2013). Specific forms of these pillars follow. 
5.1.1. Customer due diligence  
This focus ensures that financial institutions know the identity of their customers, with the major 
aim being to prevent institutions from engaging with disguised clients who deal in suspicious activities 
traceable to money laundering or other financial crimes. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
in 2001, noted that “know your customer (KYC)” policy is very crucial in safeguarding the soundness of 
banks and the integrity of the financial system as a whole.  
5.1.2 Reporting requirements 
Under the preventive AML policy, financial institutions are required to report any transaction 
suspected to relate to money laundering, terrorist financing, or any other form of financial crime to the 
country’s financial intelligent unit (FIU). There are variations in reporting methods globally; and each 
national jurisdiction usually decides the form of their report. While some financial institutions in some 
countries engage in defensive reporting to avoid potential penalties (rule-based), some in other countries 
report only significant suspicious transactions (risk-based), thereby risking criticism and penalties for 
failure to disclose sufficiently (Levi and Reuter 2006)..  
Bergstrom, Svedberg-Helgesson & Mörth (2011) document that the risk-based approach in 
relation to customer due diligence has blurred the boundaries between private and public sectors, and 
opine that involving the private sector in the process of setting the rules may compromise the normal 
understanding of accountability. However, some countries such as South Africa, as recently as June 2017, 
amended their Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA)
26
 and introduced the risk-based approach to 
reporting.  
5.1.3. Supervision 
Financial institutions are obligated to keep records of identification and transactions in relation to 
the first focus of preventive (AML) policies (customer due diligence), for instance KYC documents, as 
well as archive or store data related to all transactions. The essence of this focus is to enable regulatory 
                                                          
26https://www.fic.gov.za/Documents/A%20NEW%20APPROACH%20TO%20COMBAT%20MONEY%20LAUNDERING%20
AND%20TERRORIST%20FINANCING%20(2).pdf.  
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authorities to be able to carry out their supervisory oversight function of banks.  Safeguarding data related 
to every transaction also facilitates investigation of cases of suspicious money laundering activities.  
5.1.4. Sanctions 
Financial institutions are subjected to sanctions, penalties, fines, and their likes, as a consequence 
of breach of AML laws. As highlighted in Table 1, banks and other financial institutions have been fined 
or closed down due to breaches of AML laws. Notwithstanding several existing AML laws, banks 
surprisingly still expose themselves to fines, confiscation or freezing of assets, etc. Besides fines and 
sanctions, banks incur other costs (related to training, administration, technological upgrade, etc.) in the 
quest to comply with AML laws (Roth et al. 2004). Because of uncertainties in determining the true 
amount or extent of monies laundered, and the cost of complying with AML laws, it is difficult to 
determine which AML techniques work better or which ones are more or less cost-effective. 
In light of this surmised and/or implicit relative inefficacy of extant money laundering mitigation 
mechanisms (AML policies) deployed by banks, could a more efficacious solution(s) be found elsewhere, 
especially within the bank’s ambit? 
 
6. Any Role for the Board of Directors of Banks? 
According to a white paper for the Association of Certified AML Specialists (ACAMS), by 
Jeffrey Haude
27
, banks’ boards of directors have the responsibility to oversee their activities, including 
AML compliance programs which, in turn, contribute to the safety and soundness of financial institutions 
and markets in general. These boards have the right to demand accurate, complete and timely data 
regarding money laundering or any other financial activity. The board also has the right to challenge 
management and offer direction, where needed, as to ensure that key risks are mitigated and banks’ 
objectives of profitability cum social responsibility are achieved. 
In line with this report, we argue in this chapter that banks’ boards of directors have a role to play 
in combating money laundering, which is widely acknowledged to occur largely via banks. With the 
substantial economic costs associated with money laundering, the boards should not only insist on 
strongly encouraging their banks to comply with AML laws so as to avoid costly fines and attendant 
reputational capital loss (that can come about due to money laundering offences), but they should also 
insist on it, both in appearance and effect, on the grounds of corporate social responsibility (CSR), as 
                                                          
27 http://www.acams.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/A-Principles-Based-Approach-for-Auditing-Board-Reporting-Jeff-
Houde.pdf.  
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responsible corporate citizens of the economic community within which they conduct business (Ojah, 
2014). To illustrate the wisdom of this position, we recall how, e.g., the share value of Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia declined by over 10% immediately after AUSTRAC announced, on 2
nd
 August 2017, 
that it has commenced legal action on the bank over money laundering accusation
28
.  
Risk-based approach to reporting suspicious money laundering activities often primarily depends 
on banks’ discretion. Boards should commit to engaging with bank management based on both cost-
benefit analysis and CSR to, for instance, decide either to adopt rule-based or risk-based approach to 
reporting illegal activities. The major question to address is: Should banks be fine with operating in fear 
and, as a consequence, incur attendant high cost of reporting, or absorb the risk of not reporting all 
suspected activities and supposedly keep their cost of compliance to perceived low levels (with little 
regard for the effective economic consequence of this myopic view)?  
A socially responsive board should proactively advice its firm (the bank) to choose the rule-based 
AML reporting approach, as a way of signaling integrity and probity, even if the national regulatory 
authorities offer latitude on the use of the discretionary reporting approach as well. The view here is that, 
“CSR is only effectively costly when firms adopt some public relations oriented program around CSR 
instead of adopting CSR as a strategic initiative that is an integral part of doing business” (Ojah, 2014). 
That is, the issue of contestation between high cost of reporting all transactions as demanded under rule-
based approach and the risk of reputational damage/penalty for failure/refusal to disclose sufficiently 
under risk-based approach should be a non-issue here. 
An effective way for boards of banks to prudently address this need for ensuring that banks 
entrench a sustainable ethos of anti-unproductive-behaviors is via appropriate board committees. Unlike 
nonfinancial services firms, where audit, financial, and remuneration and compensation committees, are 
considered priority; banking firms must have ‘risk management’, ‘loan portfolio profile’ committees and 
their likes ranked higher. Particularly, board members with dynamic risk management skills (e.g., 
financial economists, people with R&D/innovation and regulatory/supervision backgrounds) should be 
appointed to bank boards and made to staff and chair the ‘risk management’ committee. 
Another area where we recommend boards should get involved in the AML stance is in providing 
the right incentives to personnel responsible for providing information regarding untoward activities, 
including money laundering. E.g., some firms adopt behavior-modifying mechanisms termed “claw-back 
policies”, where performance bonus based on reporting accurate and reliable financial figures are 
withdrawn due to past period’s sub-par performance. Moreover, boards can insist on hiring qualified 
                                                          
28 https://www.ft.com/content/0b75c64a-9112-11e7-a9e6-11d2f0ebb7f0. 
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auditors or forensic/financial experts, whose forecasts and judgement are known to be based primarily on 
accurate data and research, rather than on mere suspicion of transactions
29
. 
Along the lines of boards insisting on proper matching of personnel expertise and key tasks 
through effective incentive designs, periodic training on evolution of the banking landscape – e.g., 
contemporary surveillance technology and disruptive business models engendered by dynamism of 
digitization – must be part of such vital training for board members. Such periodic training will acquaint 
boards with the true operational environment of their firms and equip them to push for appropriately 
designed incentive programs for bank management and personnel.  
Given that money laundering indisputably thrives within a web of cross-border banking 
transactions, an obvious area needing boards’ oversight and/or direction is the area of banks’ external 
(international) engagement. Corresponding banks are generally ‘money center banks’, most of which are 
transnational firms which often have been caught up in illicit funds transfers/dealings and the likes (e.g., 
Barclays, HSBC, Standard Chartered and Citibank, to name a few that have been in the news recently). 
To signal probity and responsible corporate citizenry, proactive boards can insist on their banks’ non-
association with tainted banks as correspondent banks. Implicit here is the importance of a board 
committee that would reflect “cross-border/international and corresponding banking activities”. In the 
same vein, boards can also insist on their banks keeping their offshore activities away from notorious tax 
havens (Kudrle and Eden 2003, Van Fossen 2003, Desai et al. 2006, and Dhamapala 2008). 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
By exhaustively defining money laundering and related matters, we made the important point that 
money laundering comes about because of corrupt activities and the need for illicit funds to be moved 
around (laundered). We further observed that although other mechanisms for laundering such ‘soiled 
funds’ exist30, banks in particular and other financial institutions and markets in general, are the dominant 
mechanism (platform) for effecting money laundering with minimal fuss or exposure on the part of 
                                                          
29 In line with our view here, Commonwealth Bank of Australia recently overhauled its board of directors, on 4th September 
2017, due to its recent money laundering scandal, believing that the scandal had significantly dented their reputation and the 
bank’s management team, which in turn drastically affected their bank’s share price. https://www.ft.com/content/0b75c64a-9112-
11e7-a9e6-11d2f0ebb7f0.  
30 Transfer pricing, as the other important conduit/mechanism for money laundering, is not as amenable to scrutiny as are 
financial services firms because it sits between legitimate mode of business conduct and overt intent to subvert disclosure and/or 
tax laws; and it is carried out ‘privately’ within a firm. 
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launderers. This is so primarily because banks are legitimate, ubiquitous financial services institutions 
whose essence of being is to financially intermediate. 
Expectedly, most extant anti-laundering (AML) laws and measures target banks’ compliance with 
these AML requirements, as paramount. Yet because of the seeming conflict between banks’ profit and 
CSR objectives, and the demand to demonstrate compliance, these bank-targeted AML measures appear 
ineffectual. This chapter, therefore, proposes that a more efficacious assistance may come from the role of 
banks’ boards. At a general and/or high level, we recommend that the intervention of banks’ boards must 
insist on: (i) the primacy of transparency and upholding of both real and perceived reputational capital of 
the bank, and (ii) ascertaining that their banks’ relations with corresponding banks distributed across 
several national borders or banks domiciled in notorious tax havens, are demonstrably above board. And 
these guiding lights, we believe, will be effective in enthroning ethos of anti-unproductive bank activity 
and behavior via initiation of appropriate ‘financial services firm’ oriented board committees. 
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